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OPINION OF THE COURT
            
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Brian Prowel appeals the District Court’s summary
judgment in favor of his former employer, Wise Business
Forms, Inc.   Prowel sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging
that Wise harassed and retaliated against him because of sex and
religion.  The principal issue on appeal is whether Prowel has
marshaled sufficient facts for his claim of “gender stereotyping”
discrimination to be submitted to a jury.  We also consider
whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment
to Wise on Prowel’s religious discrimination claim.
I.
4We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment and we apply the same standard as
the District Court.  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512
F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate
when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  “In making this
determination, we ‘must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that
party’s favor.’”  Norfolk, 512 F.3d at 91 (quoting Abramson v.
William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir.
2001)).  Because summary judgment was entered against
Prowel, we view the record in the light most favorable to him.
II.
Prowel began working for Wise in July 1991.  A
producer and distributor of business forms, Wise employed
approximately 145 workers at its facility in Butler,
Pennsylvania.  From 1997 until his termination, Prowel operated
a machine called a nale encoder, which encodes numbers and
organizes business forms.  On December 13, 2004, after 13
years with the company, Wise informed Prowel that it was
laying him off for lack of work.
A.
Prowel’s most substantial claim is that Wise harassed and
retaliated against him because of sex.  The theory of sex
5discrimination Prowel advances is known as a “gender
stereotyping” claim, which was first recognized by the Supreme
Court as a viable cause of action in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Prowel identifies himself as an effeminate man and
believes that his mannerisms caused him not to “fit in” with the
other men at Wise.  Prowel described the “genuine stereotypical
male” at the plant as follows:
[B]lue jeans, t-shirt, blue collar worker, very
rough around the edges.  Most of the guys there
hunted.  Most of the guys there fished.  If they
drank, they drank beer, they didn’t drink gin and
tonic.  Just you know, all into football, sports, all
that kind of stuff, everything I wasn’t.
In stark contrast to the other men at Wise, Prowel
testified that he had a high voice and did not curse; was very
well-groomed; wore what others would consider dressy clothes;
was neat; filed his nails instead of ripping them off with a utility
knife; crossed his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot “the
way a woman would sit”; walked and carried himself in an
effeminate manner; drove a clean car; had a rainbow decal on
the trunk of his car; talked about things like art, music, interior
design, and decor; and pushed the buttons on the nale encoder
with “pizzazz.”
Some of Prowel’s co-workers reacted negatively to his
demeanor and appearance.  During the last two years of his
employment at Wise, a female co-worker frequently called
 In its brief, Wise notes that Prowel’s affidavit included1
incidents of harassment that were not mentioned during
Prowel’s deposition.  Wise argued to the District Court that
these incidents should not be considered because they
contradicted Prowel’s prior sworn testimony in violation of
Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991).
Although the District Court disagreed with Wise’s argument in
this regard, it nevertheless held that these facts did not create a
genuine issue of material fact on Prowel’s gender stereotyping
claim.
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Prowel “Princess.”  In a similar vein, co-workers made
comments such as: “Did you see what Rosebud was wearing?”;
“Did you see Rosebud sitting there with his legs crossed, filing
his nails?”; and “Look at the way he walks.”1
Prowel also testified that he is homosexual.  At some
point prior to November 1997, Prowel was “outed” at work
when a newspaper clipping of a “man-seeking-man” ad was left
at his workstation with a note that read: “Why don’t you give
him a call, big boy.”  Prowel reported the incident to two
management-level personnel and asked that something be done.
The culprit was never identified, however.
After Prowel was outed, some of his co-workers began
causing problems for him, subjecting him to verbal and written
attacks during the last seven years of his tenure at Wise.  In
addition to the nicknames “Princess” and “Rosebud,” a female
co-worker called him “fag” and said: “Listen, faggot, I don’t
7have to put up with this from you.”  Prowel reported this to his
shift supervisor but received no response.
At some point during the last two years of Prowel’s
employment, a pink, light-up, feather tiara with a package of
lubricant jelly was left on his nale encoder.  The items were
removed after Prowel complained to Henry Nolan, the shift
supervisor at that time.  On March 24, 2004, as Prowel entered
the plant, he overheard a co-worker state: “I hate him.  They
should shoot all the fags.”  Prowel reported this remark to
Nolan, who said he would look into it.  Prowel also overheard
conversations between co-workers, one of whom was a
supervisor, who disapproved of how he lived his life.  Finally,
messages began to appear on the wall of the men’s bathroom,
claiming Prowel had AIDS and engaged in sexual relations with
male co-workers.  After Prowel complained, the company
repainted the restroom.
B.
In addition to the harassment Prowel allegedly
experienced because of his sex, he also claims that he was
discriminated against because of religion.  Specifically, Prowel
argues that his conduct did not conform to the company’s
religious beliefs.  When asked at his deposition what those
religious beliefs were, Prowel responded: “a man should not lay
with another man.”
For a few months during the spring of 2004, Prowel
found anonymous prayer notes on his work machine on a daily
basis.  Prowel also found messages indicating he was a sinner
8for the way he lived his life.  Additionally, he found a note
stating: “Rosebud will burn in hell.”  Prowel attributed these
notes and comments to Michael Croyle, a Christian employee
who refused to speak to Prowel.  Moreover, Prowel testified in
his deposition that nothing was left on his machine after Croyle
left the company.
Another co-worker, Thomas Bowser, stated that he did
not approve of how Prowel lived his life.  Prowel testified that
Bowser brought religious pamphlets to work that stated “the end
is coming” and “have you come clean with your maker?”
C.
Prowel alleges that his co-workers shunned him and his
work environment became so stressful that he had to stop his car
on the way to work to vomit.  At some point in 2004, Prowel
became increasingly dissatisfied with his work assignments and
pay.  Prowel believed he was asked to perform more varied tasks
than other nale encoder operators, but was not compensated
fairly for these extra tasks, even though work piled up on his
nale encoder.
In April 2004, Prowel considered suing Wise and stated
his intentions to four non-management personnel, asking them
to testify on his behalf.   Prowel allegedly told his colleagues
that the lawsuit would be based on harassment for not “fitting
in”; he did not say anything about being harassed because of his
homosexuality.  These four colleagues complained to
management that Prowel was bothering them.
 Prowel did not oppose Wise’s motion for summary2
judgment with regard to his termination claims or his PHRA
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On May 6, 2004, General Manager Jeff Straub convened
a meeting with Prowel and supervisors Nolan and John Hodak
to discuss Prowel’s concern that he was doing more work for
less money than other nale encoder operators.  Prowel’s
compensation and workload were discussed, but the parties did
not reach agreement on those issues.  Straub then asked Prowel
if he had approached employees to testify for him in a lawsuit,
and Prowel replied that he had not done so.  Prowel has since
conceded that he did approach other employees in this regard.
On December 13, 2004, Prowel was summoned to meet
with his supervisors, who informed him that he was terminated
effective immediately for lack of work.
III.
After exhausting his administrative remedies before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Prowel sued Wise
in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951, et seq. (PHRA).
Prowel alleged harassment and wrongful termination because of
sex and religion and concomitant retaliation.  Following
discovery, Wise moved for summary judgment and the District
Court granted the company’s motion in its entirety.  As relevant
to this appeal,  the District Court held that Prowel’s suit was2
claims.
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§3
1331 and 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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merely a claim for sexual orientation discrimination — which is
not cognizable under Title VII — that he repackaged as a gender
stereotyping claim in an attempt to avoid summary judgment.
Prowel’s religious discrimination claim failed for the same
reason.  As for Prowel’s retaliation claim, the District Court held
that Prowel had a good faith belief that he had engaged in
protected activity under Title VII, but that his belief was not
objectively reasonable given that his complaint was actually
based on sexual orientation discrimination.  Prowel filed this
timely appeal.3
IV.
In evaluating Wise’s motion for summary judgment, the
District Court properly focused on our decision in Bibby v.
Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.
2001), wherein we stated: “Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Congress has
repeatedly rejected legislation that would have extended Title
VII to cover sexual orientation.”  Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
This does not mean, however, that a homosexual individual is
barred from bringing a sex discrimination claim under Title VII,
11
which plainly prohibits discrimination “because of sex.”  42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  As the District Court noted, “once a
plaintiff shows that harassment is motivated by sex, it is no
defense that it may also have been motivated by anti-gay
animus.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (citing Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265).  In
sum, “[w]hatever the sexual orientation of a plaintiff bringing a
same-sex sexual harassment claim, that plaintiff is required to
demonstrate that the harassment was directed at him or her
because of his or her sex.”  Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265.
Both Prowel and Wise rely heavily upon Bibby.  Wise
claims this appeal is indistinguishable from Bibby and therefore
we should affirm its summary judgment for the same reason we
affirmed summary judgment in Bibby.  Prowel counters that
reversal is required  here because gender stereotyping was not
at issue in Bibby.  As we shall explain, Bibby does not dictate
the result in this appeal.  Because it guides our analysis,
however, we shall review it in some detail.
John Bibby, a homosexual man, was a long-time
employee of the Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company.  Id.
at 259.  The company terminated Bibby after he sought sick
leave, but ultimately reinstated him.  Id.  After Bibby’s
reinstatement, he alleged that he was assaulted and harmed by
co-workers and supervisors when he was subjected to crude
remarks and derogatory sexual graffiti in the bathrooms.  Id. at
260.
Bibby filed a complaint with the Philadelphia
Commission on Human Relations (PCHR), alleging sexual
orientation discrimination.  Id.  After the PCHR issued a right-
12
to-sue letter, Bibby sued in federal court alleging, inter alia,
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.  Id.  The district
court granted summary judgment for the company because
Bibby was harassed not “because of sex,” but rather because of
his sexual orientation, which is not cognizable under Title VII.
Id. at 260-61.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding that Bibby
presented insufficient evidence to support a claim of same-sex
harassment under Title VII.  Despite acknowledging that
harassment based on sexual orientation has no place in a just
society, we explained that Congress chose not to include sexual
orientation harassment in Title VII.  Id. at 261, 265.
Nevertheless, we stated that employees may — consistent with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse — raise a
Title VII gender stereotyping claim, provided they can
demonstrate that “the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their]
noncompliance with gender stereotypes.”  Id. at 264; accord
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir.
2006); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874
(9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194
F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999).  Because Bibby did not claim
gender stereotyping, however, he could not prevail on that
theory.  We also concluded, in dicta, that even had we construed
Bibby’s claim to involve gender stereotyping, he did not marshal
sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on that
claim.  Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264-65.
In light of the foregoing discussion, we disagree with
both parties’ arguments that Bibby dictates the outcome of this
case.  Bibby does not carry the day for Wise because in that case,
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the plaintiff failed to raise a gender stereotyping claim as Prowel
has done here.  Contrary to Prowel’s argument, however, Bibby
does not require that we reverse the District Court’s summary
judgment merely because we stated that a gender stereotyping
claim is cognizable under Title VII; such has been the case since
the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.  Instead, we
must consider whether the record, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Prowel, contains sufficient facts from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against “because of sex.”
Before turning to the record, however, we must revisit
Price Waterhouse, which held that a woman who was denied a
promotion because she failed to conform to gender stereotypes
had a claim cognizable under Title VII as she was discriminated
against “because of sex.”
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins had been denied
partnership in an accounting firm because she used profanity;
was not charming; and did not walk, talk, or dress in a feminine
manner.  490 U.S. at 235.  A plurality of the Supreme Court
concluded that “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot
be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”  Id. at 250.  The plurality also noted: “we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”  Id. at 251
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(quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (some internal quotations omitted).  Thus,
the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination
against women for failing to conform to a traditionally feminine
demeanor and appearance.
Like our decision in Bibby, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Price Waterhouse provides the applicable legal framework,
but does not resolve this case.  Unlike in Price Waterhouse —
where Hopkins’s sexual orientation was not at issue — here
there is no dispute that Prowel is homosexual.  The difficult
question, therefore, is whether the harassment he suffered at
Wise was because of his homosexuality, his effeminacy, or both.
As this appeal demonstrates, the line between sexual
orientation discrimination and discrimination “because of sex”
can be difficult to draw.  In granting summary judgment for
Wise, the District Court found that Prowel’s claim fell clearly on
one side of the line, holding that Prowel’s sex discrimination
claim was an artfully-pleaded claim of sexual orientation
discrimination.  However, our analysis — viewing the facts and
inferences in favor of Prowel — leads us to conclude that the
record is ambiguous on this dispositive question.  Accordingly,
Prowel’s gender stereotyping claim must be submitted to a jury.
Wise claims it laid off Prowel because the company
decided to reduce the number of nale encoder operators from
three to two.  This claim is not without support in the record.
After Prowel was laid off, no one was hired to operate the nale
encoder during his shift.  Moreover, market conditions caused
Wise to lay off 44 employees at its Pennsylvania facility
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between 2001 and September 2006, and the company’s
workforce shrank from 212 in 2001 to 145 in 2008.  General
Manager Straub testified that in determining which nale encoder
operator to lay off, he considered various factors, including
customer service, productivity, cooperativeness, willingness to
perform other tasks (the frequency with which employees
complained about working on other machines), future
advancement opportunities, and cost.   According to Wise,
Prowel was laid off because: comments on his daily production
reports reflected an uncooperative and insubordinate attitude; he
was the highest paid operator;  he complained when asked to
work on different machines; and he did not work to the best of
his ability when operating the other machines.
Prowel asserts that these reasons were pretextual and he
was terminated because of his complaints to management about
harassment and his discussions with co-workers regarding a
potential lawsuit against the company.  In this respect, the record
indicates that Prowel’s work compared favorably to the other
two nale encoder operators.  Specifically, Prowel worked on
other equipment fifty-four times during the last half of 2004
while a co-worker  did so just once;  Prowel also ran more jobs
and impressions per hour than that same co-worker; and
Prowel’s attendance was significantly better than the third nale
encoder operator.  Finally, although Wise laid off forty-four
workers between 2001 and 2006, it laid off no one in 2003, only
Prowel in 2004, and just two in 2005.  Although  Prowel is
unaware what role his sexual orientation played in his
termination, he alleges that he was harassed and retaliated
against not because of the quality of his work, but rather because
he failed to conform to gender stereotypes.
16
The record demonstrates that Prowel has adduced
evidence of harassment based on gender stereotypes.  He
acknowledged that he has a high voice and walks in an
effeminate manner.  In contrast with the typical male at Wise,
Prowel testified that he: did not curse and was very well-
groomed; filed his nails instead of ripping them off with a utility
knife; crossed his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot “the
way a woman would sit.”  Prowel also discussed things like art,
music, interior design, and decor, and pushed the buttons on his
nale encoder with “pizzazz.”  Prowel’s effeminate traits did not
go unnoticed by his co-workers, who commented: “Did you see
what Rosebud was wearing?”; “Did you see Rosebud sitting
there with his legs crossed, filing his nails?”; and “Look at the
way he walks.”  Finally, a  co-worker deposited a feathered,
pink tiara at Prowel’s workstation.  When the aforementioned
facts are considered in the light most favorable to Prowel, they
constitute sufficient evidence of gender stereotyping harassment
— namely, Prowel was harassed because he did not conform to
Wise’s vision of how a man should look, speak, and act —
rather than harassment based solely on his sexual orientation.
To be sure, the District Court correctly noted that the
record is replete with evidence of harassment motivated by
Prowel’s sexual orientation.  Thus, it is possible that the
harassment Prowel alleges was because of his sexual orientation,
not his effeminacy.  Nevertheless, this does not vitiate the
possibility that Prowel was also harassed for his failure to
conform to gender stereotypes.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . .  was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
 The District Court correctly reasoned that Prowel’s4
retaliation claim was derivative of his gender stereotyping claim.
Since Prowel is entitled to a jury trial on that claim, it follows a
fortiori that Prowel is entitled to put his retaliation claim before
the jury as well. 
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other factors also motivated the practice.”).  Because both
scenarios are plausible, the case presents a question of fact for
the jury and is not appropriate for summary judgment.
In support of the District Court’s summary judgment,
Wise argues persuasively that every case of sexual orientation
discrimination cannot translate into a triable case of gender
stereotyping discrimination, which would contradict Congress’s
decision not to make sexual orientation discrimination
cognizable under Title VII.  Nevertheless, Wise cannot
persuasively argue that because Prowel is homosexual, he is
precluded from bringing a gender stereotyping claim.  There is
no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an
effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping
claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.  As long
as the employee — regardless of his or her sexual orientation —
marshals sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could
conclude that harassment or discrimination occurred “because
of sex,” the case is not appropriate for summary judgment.  For
the reasons we have articulated, Prowel has adduced sufficient
evidence to submit this claim to a jury.4
V.
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Prowel also argues that the District Court erred when it
granted Wise summary judgment on his claim of religious
harassment.  To survive summary judgment on this claim,
Prowel must show: (1) intentional harassment because of
religion, that (2) was severe or pervasive, and (3) detrimentally
affected him, and (4) would detrimentally affect a reasonable
person of the same religion in that position, and (5) the existence
of respondeat superior liability.  Abramson, 260 F.3d at 276-77.
Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that
Prowel cannot satisfy the first essential element of his cause of
action.  Prowel admits that no one at Wise harassed him based
on his religious beliefs.  Rather, Prowel contends that he was
harassed for failing to conform to Wise’s religious beliefs.  Title
VII seeks to protect employees not only from discrimination
against them on the basis of their religious beliefs, but also from
forced religious conformity.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 20 (1993); Abramson, 260 F.3d at 277.  Nevertheless,
when asked to identify which of Wise’s beliefs to which he
failed to conform, Prowel could identify just one: “that a man
should not lay with another man.”  Likewise, in response to
Wise’s statement of undisputed material facts, Prowel admitted:
“the only way in which [he] failed to conform to his co-workers’
religious beliefs was by virtue of his status as a gay man.”
Finally, over a month after Wise moved for summary judgment,
Prowel averred that he suffered religious harassment because:
“I am a gay male, which status several of my co-workers
considered to be contrary to being a good Christian.”  
Prowel’s identification of this single “religious” belief
leads ineluctably to the conclusion that he was harassed not
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“because of religion,” but because of his sexual orientation.
Given Congress’s repeated rejection of legislation that would
have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation, see Bibby,
260 F.3d at 261, we cannot accept Prowel’s de facto invitation
to hold that he was discriminated against “because of religion”
merely by virtue of his homosexuality.
In support of his argument that the District Court should
not have granted Wise summary judgment on his religious
harassment claim, Prowel relies upon Erdmann v. Tranquility
Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  In Erdmann, a
homosexual employee claimed religious discrimination because
his boss insisted that he become heterosexual.  Id. at 1156.
Wholly apart from the fact that it is not binding precedent,
Erdmann cannot bear the weight Prowel places upon it.  Unlike
Prowel, Erdmann did not claim Title VII religious harassment
based exclusively upon his homosexual status.  Rather,  the
employer in that case insisted that Erdmann convert to the
employer’s faith and lead the company’s daily prayer service.
Id. at 1158.  Prowel has not cited any facts supporting analogous
religious coercion.
In sum, the same principle that requires Prowel’s gender
stereotyping claim to be submitted to the jury requires that his
religious harassment claim fail at this stage.  As explained
above, Prowel’s gender stereotyping claim is not limited to, or
coextensive with, a claim of sexual orientation harassment.
Accordingly, the jury will have to determine the basis of the
harassment.  By contrast, Prowel’s religious harassment claim
is based entirely upon his status as a gay man.  Because Prowel’s
claim was a repackaged claim for sexual orientation
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discrimination — which is not cognizable under Title VII — we
hold that the District Court did not err in granting Wise
summary judgment on that claim.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment
of the District Court as to Prowel’s sexual harassment and
corresponding retaliation claim, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court as to Prowel’s religious harassment and
corresponding retaliation claim, and will remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
